、互聯網+護理服務
Internet Plus nursing services
國家衛生健康委員會發布《“互聯網+護理服務”試點工作方案》，確定在北京市、天津市、上海市、江蘇省、浙江省、廣東省6省市進行“互聯網+護理服務”試點，試點時間為2019年2月至12月。
According to the announcement, Internet Plus nursing services will be an online system that will enable discharged patients and elderly or disabled people to call registered nurses to visit them at home and provide nursing services.
方案指出，“互聯網+護理服務”是供康復期患者或失能老人聯系注冊護士上門提供護理服務的一個在線平臺。
服務對象是誰？
方案提到，“互聯網+護理服務（Internet Plus nursing services）”重點對高齡或失能老年人（elderly or disabled people）、康復期患者（convalescents）和終末期患者（terminally ill patients）等行動不便的人群，提供慢病管理（chronic care management）、康復護理（rehabilitation nursing）、專項護理（specific care）、健康教育（health education）、安寧療護（hospice care）等方面的護理服務。
“互聯網+護理服務”的護士需具備什么條件？
方案明確，派出的注冊護士應當至少具備五年以上臨床護理工作經驗（registered nurses sent by pilot medical institutions should have at least five years of clinical nursing service experience）和護師（nurse practitioner）以上技術職稱，能夠在全國護士電子注冊系統中查詢。
安全保障措施
方案提出，試點醫療機構或互聯網信息技術平臺應當按照協議要求，為護士提供手機APP定位追蹤系統，配置護理工作記錄儀（nursing work recorder），使服務行為全程留痕可追溯（traceable），配備一鍵報警裝置（one-click alarm device），購買責任險、醫療意外險和人身意外險等。要建立醫療糾紛和風險防范機制（medical dispute and risk prevention mechanism），制訂應急處置預案。同時，暢通投訴、評議渠道，接受社會監督（open to public supervision），維護群眾健康權益。
去年，不少地區就已經出現“共享護士（nurse sharing）”服務，操作方式與其他共享類服務app相似，也是線上預約（making appointment online），線下服務（offering service offline），提供上門打針輸液（injection and IV）、靜脈采血（blood draw）、外科傷口換藥（wound dressing change）、灌腸（coloclysis）、吸痰導尿（aspiration of sputum and urethral catheterization）、鼻飼（nasal feeding）護理及指導等10多項服務。
不過，業內人士表示，護士上門的行業標準缺乏、風險規避制度尚無，對護士以及病人而言，都沒有保障。行業準入標準和法律監管亟待跟進，保障新醫療模式健康發展。
國家衛健委開展“互聯網+護理服務”試點工作，將在總結試點經驗的基礎上，加快完善相關政策。
6、珠峰大本營
Mount Qomolangma base camp
西藏自治區有關部門表示，西藏珠穆朗瑪峰國家級自然保護區將繼續有條件開放，依法合規的登山活動仍可進行，網傳“珠峰景區永久關閉”消息不實。
Kelsang, deputy director with the reserve's administration, said ordinary tourists are allowed to visit areas around Rongpo Monastery, 5,150 meters above sea level.
珠峰管理局副局長格桑稱，普通游客可以在海拔5150米的絨布寺周邊游覽。
As for travelers who have a climbing permit, they can go to the base camp at an altitude of 5,200 meters.
有登山許可證的游客可以前往海拔5200米的珠峰大本營。
珠穆朗瑪峰國家級自然保護區（Mount Qomolangma National Nature Reserve）于1988年設立，涉及西藏日喀則市定日、聶拉木、吉隆和定結四縣，總面積3.38萬平方公里，位于中國境內及中尼邊界上的五座海拔8000米以上山峰均在區內。
根據《中華人民共和國自然保護區條例》，自然保護區分為核心區（core zone）、緩沖區（buffer zone）和實驗區（experimental zone）。《條例》中表述：核心區“禁止任何單位和個人進入；除依照本條例第二十七條的規定經批準外，也不允許進入從事科學研究活動”。
2018年，珠峰保護區功能分區重新調整并獲國務院批準。調整后，屬實驗區的絨布寺一帶依據《條例》可以進入從事科學試驗（scientific experiments）、教學實習（teaching and practicing）、參觀考察（visit and inspection）、旅游（travel）等活動。絨布寺以上區域為珠峰保護區核心區。
2018年12月，定日縣珠峰管理局發布通告，禁止任何單位和個人進入珠峰國家級自然保護區絨布寺以上核心區旅游。
多年來，大批登山者前來挑戰極限，以至于山上遺留了大量人體排泄物（human feces）及睡袋（sleeping bags）、氧氣瓶（oxygen tanks）等各種非生物降解的登山設備（non-biodegradable climbing equipment）。
珠峰的傳統登山路線主要分為南坡和北坡，分別由尼泊爾和中國管理，近年來，兩國都加強了對珠峰登山的管理。
The total number of climbers attempting to reach the summit from the north side will be capped at 300 this year, a third fewer than normal, as China begins a large-scale clean-up of the world’s highest peak.
中國將展開大規模珠峰環保清理工作。今年，將把參與北坡登山活動的總人數控制在300人左右，比常年人數減少三分之一。
China has set up stations to sort, recycle and break down the rubbish; on the Nepalese side, organizers have started sending large waste bags with climbers during the spring climbing season to collect trash that can be winched back to base camp by helicopters.
中國設立了垃圾分類、回收以及降解的站點，尼泊爾方面則在春季登山季期間向登山人員派發大型垃圾袋，用以收集垃圾，之后由直升機運回大本營。
中國今年還將首次對海拔8000米以上的登山者尸體（the remains of mountaineering victims）進行集中處理。西藏體育局還要求登山者，在下山的時候都必須攜帶8公斤的垃圾下來。
尼泊爾從2014年開始，向登山隊收取4000美元的垃圾保證金（garbage deposit of ,000），若隊內有成員下山時未帶回8公斤的垃圾和人類排泄物（bring back 8 kg of trash and human waste），這筆保證金將被沒收（the deposit will be forfeited）。
7、紫禁城上元之夜
Lantern Festival night in the Forbidden City
The Palace Museum announced on its official website on Sunday that the "Lantern Festival night in the Forbidden City" will be held for two consecutive nights on February 19 and 20.
17日，故宮博物院官網發公告，2月19日（正月十五）、20日（正月十六）將連續兩晚舉辦“紫禁城上元之夜”活動。
The event is the first of its kind in the Palace Museum's 94-year history. The main locations open to the public will be the Meridian Gate exhibition hall, the Gate of Supreme Harmony, the East Wall, the Gate of Divine Might and other areas of the Palace Museum.
這是故宮博物院建院94年來首次舉辦“燈會”。開放地點主要在午門展廳、太和門廣場、故宮東城墻、神武門等區域。
故宮介紹，此次活動不收費（free of charge），將邀請勞動模范（model workers）、北京榜樣、快遞小哥（deliverymen）、環衛工人（sanitation workers）、解放軍和武警官兵（PLA and armed force soldiers）、消防隊員（fire fighters）、公安干警（police officers）等各界代表以及觀眾朋友（預約成功者）數千人，前往觀燈賞景，共賀良宵。
8、職業教育改革
vocational education reform
近日，國務院印發《國家職業教育改革實施方案》。
China has vowed to cultivate more quality laborers and skilled workers by reforming its vocational education systems, according to the plan.
《方案》提出，我國要改革職業教育制度，著力培養高素質勞動者和技術技能人才。
Vocational education and training systems will be reformed to match with science and technology development trends and market demands and to promote economic modernization and higher quality employment, the official documents note.
《方案》提出，服務建設現代化經濟體系和實現更高質量更充分就業需要，對接科技發展趨勢和市場需求，完善職業教育和培訓體系。
《方案》提出，從2019年開始，在職業院校、應用型本科高校啟動“學歷證書+若干職業技能等級證書（diploma plus certificates of vocational skills）”制度試點工作。
到2022年，職業院校教學條件基本達標，一大批普通本科高等學校向應用型轉變，建設50所高水平高等職業學校（50 high quality higher vocational schools）和150個骨干專業（群）（150 core specialties）。
《方案》提出了進一步辦好新時代職業教育的具體措施。
一是完善國家職業教育制度體系（improve national systems and policies relating to vocational education）。
二是構建職業教育國家標準（establish national standards for vocational education）。
三是促進產教融合（promote integration of enterprises with vocational schools and universities）。
四是建設多元辦學格局（diversified operation of vocational schools）。
9、中央一號文件
No. 1 central document
2月19日，新華社受權發布《中共中央 國務院關于堅持農業農村優先發展做好“三農”工作的若干意見》。
這份2019年的中央一號文件開宗明義指出，
今明兩年是全面建成小康社會的決勝期，“三農”領域有不少必須完成的硬任務。
This year and the next will mark a decisive period for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and quite a few tough tasks must be fulfilled in the fields relating to agriculture, rural areas and rural people.
必須堅持把解決好“三農”問題作為全黨工作重中之重不動搖。
Unswerving efforts must be made to ensure that addressing the issues relating to agriculture, rural areas and rural people enjoy a central place on the work agenda of the CPC.
中央一號文件（No. 1 central document）指中共中央每年發布的第一份文件（the first policy statement released by central authorities each year）。中共中央在2004年至2019年連續十六年發布以“三農”（農業、農村、農民）為主題的中央一號文件，強調了“三農”問題（issues relating to agriculture, rural areas and farmers）在中國社會主義現代化時期“重中之重”的地位。
2019年中央一號文件要點如下：
鞏固發展農業農村好形勢，發揮“三農”壓艙石作用，為有效應對各種風險挑戰贏得主動。
The country should consolidate the sound momentum for agricultural and rural development, capitalize on the role of agriculture, rural areas and rural people as the ballast stone, and win the upper hand in effectively handling risks and challenges.
深化農業供給側結構性改革，堅決打贏脫貧攻堅戰，充分發揮農村基層黨組織戰斗堡壘作用，全面推進鄉村振興，確保順利完成到2020年承諾的農村改革發展目標任務。
Work must be done to deepen agricultural supply-side structural reform, win the tough battle against poverty, give full play to the key role of rural primary-level Party organizations, and push forward rural vitalization in all respects, according to the document.In doing so, the country will ensure the fulfillment of goals and tasks for rural reform and development by 2020, it added.
咬定既定脫貧目標，落實已有政策部署，到2020年確保現行標準下農村貧困人口實現脫貧、貧困縣全部摘帽、解決區域性整體貧困。
Existent policies will be fully implemented to ensure the country's poverty elimination targets being realized - to lift all its rural residents living below current poverty line out of poverty and eliminate poverty in all poor counties and regions by 2020.
特色產業扶貧、易地扶貧搬遷、生態扶貧、金融扶貧、社會幫扶、干部人才等政策措施向深度貧困地區傾斜。
Focus will be put on providing assistance to areas of extreme poverty, via favorable policies ranging from major projects, poor resident relocation, finance and nurturing of talent.
著力解決突出問題。持續開展扶貧領域腐敗和作風問題專項治理。
The country vowed to solve prominent problems involving poverty reduction, and pledged consistent efforts to crack down on corruption and misconduct, according to the document.
保障重要農產品有效供給。確保糧食播種面積穩定在16.5億畝，嚴守18億畝耕地紅線，到2020年確保建成8億畝高標準農田。
The document noted that the country will strive to ensure effective supply of major agricultural products. Efforts will be made to ensure that grain planting area remains steady at 1.65 billion mu (110 million hectares) and arable land area is kept above 1.8 billion mu, as well as develop 800 million mu of high-standard farmland by 2020.
調整優化農業結構。大力發展緊缺和綠色優質農產品生產，實施大豆振興計劃，實施奶業振興行動。
It said the country will move to optimize agricultural structure, boost production of green agricultural products or those in short supply, and roll out plans to increase soybean planting and support dairy industry.
實施農業關鍵核心技術攻關行動，推動生物種業、重型農機、智慧農業、綠色投入品等領域自主創新。
The country vowed to step up breakthrough in key agricultural core technologies, and promote independent innovation in areas including biological breeding, heavy agricultural machinery, smart agriculture and green agricultural inputs.
加強“一帶一路”農業國際合作，主動擴大國內緊缺農產品進口，拓展多元化進口渠道，培育一批跨國農業企業集團。
The document also noted the country will enhance agricultural cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road, actively expand imports of agricultural products in short supply at home, diversify importing channels, and foster the development of multinational agricultural corporations.
扎實推進鄉村建設，加快補齊農村人居環境和公共服務短板，全面提升農村教育、醫療衛生、社會保障、養老、文化體育等公共服務水平。
Progress should be made to promote rural development as well as improve rural living environments and public services such as education, health care, social security, elderly care and culture.
實施村莊基礎設施建設工程。加強村內道路建設。加快完成新一輪農村電網改造。完善縣鄉村物流基礎設施網絡。加強農村污染治理和生態環境保護。
The country will take measures to improve rural infrastructure including roads, grids and logistics network, as well as enhance pollution treatment and environmental protection.
發展壯大鄉村產業，拓寬農民增收渠道。
According to the document, the country will foster the development of rural industries and diversify channels to increase the income of farmers.
加快發展鄉村特色產業。大力發展現代農產品加工業。發展鄉村新型服務業。實施數字鄉村戰略。
It stressed developing industries with local characteristics, modern agricultural product processing and new rural services. The country will also push forward a digital countryside strategy.
加強就業服務和職業技能培訓，促進農村勞動力多渠道轉移就業和增收。
The country should improve employment services and vocational training to promote the employment of the rural labor force and increase their incomes, the document said.
鼓勵外出農民工、高校畢業生、退伍軍人、城市各類人才返鄉下鄉創新創業，支持建立多種形式的創業支撐服務平臺，完善鄉村創新創業支持服務體系。
China will encourage rural migrant workers, college graduates, veterans and urban personnel to make innovations and start businesses in rural areas, and support the building of service platforms to encourage business startups.
加快構建新型農業補貼政策體系。按照適應世貿組織規則、保護農民利益、支持農業發展的原則，抓緊研究制定完善農業支持保護政策的意見。
Efforts will be stepped up to build a new policy system for agricultural subsidies, according to the document, which said the country would formulate and improve agriculture support and protection policies following principles that comply with World Trade Organization rules, protect farmers' interests and support agricultural development.
完善鄉村治理機制，保持農村社會和諧穩定。抓實建強農村基層黨組織，加強黨對“三農”工作的領導。
The document also covered policies to improve the rural governance mechanism to maintain rural harmony and stability, strengthen rural primary-level Party organizations, and enhance Party leadership on agricultural and rural affairs.
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導讀：編者按：2021國際海洋安全大會(International Maritime Security Conference 2021)7月28日在新加坡舉行。來自中國、東盟、日本、韓國、美國、德國、英國、法國、澳大利亞等國家和地區的海軍領導人和海事機構高層，以線上線下結合的方式，圍繞“安全可靠的海洋—新常態下的海洋安全”這一大會主題，深入探討海上安全所面臨的挑戰和應對策略。 中國海軍副司令員王厚斌和清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員、中國論壇特約專家周波，以視頻方式出席會議。以下為周波在“新常態下基于規則的海洋秩序”這一環節的英文發言，觀網獲得獨家授權翻譯并發布。英文原文附后。
周波：
德意志帝國宰相俾斯麥有句名言：“法律就像香腸，最好不要看到它們的制作過程”。果如其言，聯合國海洋法公約（UNCLOS）像是有史以來制作時間最長的一根“香腸”。大約140個國家圍繞公約制定進行了長達9年的談判，使其成為歷史上持續時間最長的國際法談判。可以理解的是，各方都做出了妥協，但是有些條款仍然模棱兩可，各方可以靈活解讀。
中國早在1996年就批準了《聯合國海洋法公約》，美國至今仍未批準《聯合國海洋法公約》，雙方對公約的例如航行和飛越自由的概念有不同的闡釋。中國認為，美國的軍事活動，如美國海軍在中國專屬經濟區的抵近偵察，侵犯了中國的國家安全及利益，因此不能簡單地歸類為航行自由。美國則堅持認為，其軍事活動可被歸類為航行自由和其他針對海洋的國際合法權利范圍。但我要指出的是，中國并不是持此立場的唯一的國家，至少還有25個國家對外國在本國專屬經濟區或毗連區的軍事活動有不同程度的限制。
這種差異是可以理解的，但美國根據其對《聯合國海洋法公約》的單方面解釋，表現得好像自己是海洋法的唯一捍衛者。根據五角大樓的說法，從2019年10月1日到2020年9月30日，美軍以軍事行動對“全球19個不同聲索國提出的28項不同的過度海洋聲索”提出了挑戰。因此，一個簡單的問題出現了：如果公約是好的，你美國為什么不批準它？如果不是，你為什么要以它的名義挑戰別人？
中國是唯一對美國挑釁做出軍事反應的國家。2001年發生過一起致命的中美軍機相撞事故，在海上也發生過多起危險的中美軍事對峙。二十多年來，中美兩國海軍的對話是有益的，但成果并不顯著：美方希望就如何避免艦艇和飛機近距離危險接觸進行技術性討論，而中方則指出，美國海軍在中國海域的高強度大范圍偵察和監視是對中國主權的挑釁，因而應該禁止或至少減少次數；美方要求監視美國軍艦的中國軍艦保持安全距離，中方則認為，如果美國軍艦根本不進入中國海域，它們自然安全。公正地說，中國和美國都不希望發生事故。但根本問題從一開始就存在：如果美國不想讓水沸騰，為什么還要火上澆油？畢竟，是美國軍艦定期到中國家門口挑釁，而非中國軍艦到美國家門口滋事。
遼寧艦航母編隊在南海航行。圖片來源見水印
理論上，下一次危機發生只是時間問題。如今，降低北京和華盛頓之間的風險，比降低冷戰期間美蘇之間的風險更為困難，原因有兩個：首先，華盛頓和莫斯科之間有明確界定的勢力范圍，即便雙方在其他地方打代理人戰爭，他們也避免直接對抗。但是中美之間甚至連緩沖區都沒有，美國軍艦定期在中國南海和臺灣海峽航行。
其次，美國和蘇聯通過擁有相互確保毀滅能力的軍事威懾達到了平衡，這在北京和華盛頓之間是不存在的。但在西太平洋，由于中國人民解放軍在過去幾十年里的長足發展，中美軍事力量的差距正朝著有利于中國的方向縮小。一支更強大的中國人民解放軍，只會更加堅定地維護中國的主權和領土完整。在過去三年我讀到的所有美國智庫的報告里，沒有一篇斷言美軍在西太平洋地區一定能夠戰勝解放軍。
如果我們不能解決問題，我們只能盡力應對危機，使之不至于滑入雙方都不希望發生的沖突。隧道的盡頭或許有光亮。2020年10月，中國國防部和美國國防部官員遠程召開了第一次危機溝通工作小組視頻會議，討論危機溝通、危機預防和危機管理的概念。這是第一次如此強調“危機”概念，因為之前的會談都是圍繞避免“事故”或“事件”展開的。現在，最重要的討論是危機管理，即事故發生后該如何做，這是以前從未討論過的情況。
中美兩國要想在海上化解沖突，雙方都需要遵守在“西太平洋海軍論壇”上多邊制訂的《海上意外相遇規則》（CUES）和中美雙邊制訂的《海空相遇安全行為準則》（ROB）的規則和規定，以避免誤判。避免事故的關鍵是軍艦和軍機要保持安全距離。但安全距離究竟是多少？根據《海上意外相遇規則》，在保持安全距離時，必須考慮能見度狀態、兩船的機動性和對另一船操縱意圖的理解等7個因素。顯然，這不僅需要認真討論，還需要定期培訓，以確保良好的航海技術。中美兩軍在2014年、2015年和2016年進行了聯合《海上意外相遇規則》演習。這種演習應該保持下去，部分原因是將來更強大的中國人民解放軍海軍必將在國際海域更頻繁地與美國海軍相遇。
中國海軍遼寧艦航母與美軍“馬斯廷”號驅逐艦在南海“同框”。（美國海軍官網）
會議組織者要求我們討論新常態下基于規則的秩序。那么新常態是什么？所謂的“自由開放的印太”不是新常態，而是一個新神話。捫心自問，印度洋—太平洋地區何時不自由不開放？海洋是相通的。在人類歷史上，很少有國家試圖封鎖國際海峽或海上通道。印太地區最突出的問題是2008年至2013年在亞丁灣和索馬里盆地猖獗的海盜行為。現在，在國際海軍的共同努力下，這種現象已基本鏟除。
“自由開放的印太”實際上是對中國欲蓋彌彰的攻擊，也是以東盟的“中心地位”為代價的。原因很簡單，從地理上講，如果東盟位于太平洋的中心，就不能同時處于印度洋—太平洋的中心。
觀察美日澳印四方安全對話（QUAD）會如何演變將很有趣。如果這是基于對中國的共同不滿，那么將四國聯系在一起的紐帶不可能牢固。中國是美國最大的貿易伙伴之一，也是日本、澳大利亞和印度的最大貿易伙伴。至少可以說，他們都不愿意為了其他三國的利益而犧牲自己與中國的經濟關系。
在國際海事領域，一個新常態就是中國人民解放軍海軍越來越強大，它已經擁有世界上最多的艦艇，它的目標是到本世紀中葉發展成為世界一流海軍。任何時候，都有中國海軍艦艇在世界某地航行。
這對世界意味著什么？當然，一支更強大的中國海軍將在維護中國主權和領土完整方面發揮更重要的作用，但在臺灣問題或者南海問題上并不需要這么多艦艇。是中國巨大且不斷增長的海外利益和一個大國義不容辭的國際責任，促使中國建設世界一流海軍。在國防白皮書中，維護中國海外利益，參與地區和國際安全合作以維護地區和世界和平，被描述為解放軍的“戰略任務”。
另一個新常態是，中國是一個不同于歷史上所有其他大國的新型海洋強國。中國無意當世界警察，因此，它不會試圖扼住國際海峽的咽喉要道。它不會建立所謂的“珍珠鏈”。相反，中國通過國際合作維護自己的海外利益，承擔自己的國際責任。在印度洋打擊海盜是中國海軍如何實現這一目標的一個杰出范例。在中國海軍編隊護航的大約7000艘船只中，有一半是外國船只。中國海軍加入多國海軍在亞丁灣護航意義有三：一是打擊海盜；二是維護海上通道安全；三是共同捍衛航行自由。這種踐行也許是彌合《聯合國海洋法公約》模糊之處的一個有效辦法。
（翻頁查看英文版）
Rules-based Maritime Order in The New Norm
Zhou Bo
Chancellor of the German Reich Otto von Bismarck famously said, “Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made”. In this regard, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) looks like the longest sausage ever made. It was negotiated for nine years by around 140 countries, making it the longest-running international law negotiation in history. Understandably, compromises are made and ambiguities that could be flexibly interpreted still found.
China, a country that has ratified the UNCLOS as early as 1996 and the US, a country so far hasn’t ratified the UNCLOS have different interpretations of the UNCLO, say, on freedom of navigation and overflight. China believes that American military activities, such as the close-in reconnaissance and surveillance by the US Navy in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), infringe on China’s security interests and therefore cannot be simply categorized as freedom of navigation. The US maintains that its military activities fall within the freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea. But I wish to point out that China is not the only country that holds such a view. At least 25 other countries also have restrictions regarding foreign military activities in their exclusive economic zones or contiguous zones to varying degrees.
Such difference is understandable, but the US, based upon its own interpretations of the UNCLOS, would behave as if it is the sole guardian of the maritime law. According to the Pentagon, from October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020, U.S. forces operationally challenged “28 different excessive maritime claims made by 19 different claimants throughout the world”. Therefore, a simple question arises: If the Convention is good, why don’t you ratify it? And if it is not, why would you challenge others in the name of it?
China is the only country that has responded militarily to American provocations. There were a deadly aircraft collision in 2001 and a number of dangerous encounters at sea. For over two decades, the Chinese and American navies’ dialogues are useful but not fruitful: the American side wanted technical discussions on how to avoid close and dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft while the Chinese side would point out that American navy’s intense surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s waters were provocations to China’s sovereignty that should be stopped or at least reduced; Americans asked Chinese ships monitoring American ships to keep safe distance and Chinese believe the American ships are most safe if they don’t come at all. It is fair to say that neither China nor the US want an accident. But the fundamental problem exists from the very beginning: if the US doesn’t want the water to boil, why keep throwing wood into the fire? Afterall, it is the American ships that have come regularly to China’s doorsteps and not the other way round.
In theory, it is only a matter of time before the next crisis occurs. Today, risk reduction for Beijing and Washington is more difficult than that between the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war for two reasons. First, there are clearly defined spheres of influence between Washington and Moscow which allows them to avoid direct confrontations even if proxy wars had to be fought elsewhere. But between China and the United States, there isn’t even a buffer zone in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Straits where the American naval vessels sail regularly.
Second, the United States and the Soviet Union were balanced by mutually assured destruction which is not found between Beijing and Washington. But in the Western Pacific, the gap in military strength is shrinking in China’s favor thanks to the advances of the PLA in the past decades. A stronger PLA can only become more determined to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of all the reports by American think tanks that I read in the last three years, none of them concludes that within the Western Pacific, the US military is guaranteed to win over the PLA.
If we cannot resolve the problem, we can only try our best to manage a crisis sliding into a confrontation that neither wants. Perhaps there is some light at the end of the tunnel. In October 2020, officials of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the US Department of Defense convened the first Crisis Communication Working Group meeting by video teleconference to discuss concepts of crisis communications, crisis prevention and crisis management. This is the first time that crisis is stressed as such because previously talks were centered on avoiding “accidents” or “incidents”. The most significant part is management of crisis, that is, what to do after an accident has happened, a scenario never discussed before.
For China and the US to deconflict at sea, both sides need to observe the multilaterally agreed rules and regulations of the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea” (CUES) made at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the bilaterally agreed “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” (ROB) to avoid miscalculations. The key to avoid an accident is for ships and aircraft to keep safe distance. But what exactly is the safe distance? According to CUES, seven factors ranging from the state of visibility, the maneuverability of both vessels and understanding of the maneuvering intentions of the other vessel have to be considered in keeping safe distance. Apparently, they require not only serious discussions, but also regular training to ensure good seamanship. The two militaries conducted joint drills on CUES in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Such exercises should continue, partly because a stronger PLA Navy is bound to meet the US Navy more often in the international waters in days to come.
The organizer of the conference asks us to discuss the rules-based order in the new norm. Then what is the new norm? The so-called “free and open Indo-Pacific” is not the new norm, it is a new myth. Ask yourself when the Indo-Pacific is not free and open? Oceans are interconnected. In human history, few countries have attempted to block international straits or sea lanes. The most outstanding problem in the Indo-Pacific was piracy that was rampant in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin from 2008 to 2013. Now it is basically eradicated thanks to the joint efforts of the international navies.
The “free and open Indo-Pacific” is in fact thinly-veiled attack on China. It also comes at a cost on the centrality of the ASEAN. The reason is simple, geographically speaking, if ASEAN lies at the heart of the Pacific, it cannot be at the center of the Indo-Pacific at the same time.
It would be interesting to see how the Quad might evolve. If it is based upon a common resentment of China, then the glue that binds the four won’t be strong enough. China is one of the top trading partners of the US and the largest trading partner of Japan, Australia and India. None of them would wish to sacrifice their own economic ties with China for the interests of the other three countries, to say the least.
In the international maritime domain, one of the new norms is that the PLA Navy is getting stronger and stronger. It already has the largest number of ships in the world. It is aiming to grow into a world-class navy by mid-century. At any given time, there are Chinese naval vessels sailing somewhere in the rest of the world.
The question is what this means for the world. Of course, a stronger Chinese navy will play a more important role in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the PLA Navy doesn’t need so many ships for Taiwan issue or the South China Sea issue. It is China’s tremendous and ever-growing overseas interests and international obligations which are incumbent upon a major power that call for China to build a world-class navy. In the defense white paper, safeguarding China’s overseas interests and participating in regional and international security cooperation to safeguard regional and world peace are described as “strategic tasks” of the PLA.
Another new norm is China is a new type of sea power different from all others in history. China has no intentions to police the world. Therefore, it won’t attempt to control the chokepoints in the international straits. It won’t establish the so-called “string of pearls”. Instead, China will safeguard its overseas interests and shoulder its international obligations through international cooperation. Countering piracy in the Indian Ocean is a brilliant example of how the Chinese navy might achieve that. Half of all the 7000 or so ships escorted by the Chinese naval flotillas are foreign ships. The significance of the Chinese navy joining the international navies in counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden is three-fold: it is counter-piracy; it is maintenance of sea lines of communication, and it is also perseverance of freedom of navigation. Such a practice might be a useful way to mitigate the ambiguity of the UNCLOS.
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